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IDENTITY CRISIS: THE OBSOLESCENCE OF
JASOPERSAUD V. RHO AND THE
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EXPERT EXCEPTION
Mark D. Shifton*
INTRODUCTION
During a recent thriller directed by the late Stanley Kubrick,'
Tom Cruise, playing Doctor William Harford, embarks on a voyage
of both geographic and psychological distance. Under the spell of
extreme jealousy, he walks the streets of New York City seeking to
understand the societal forces affecting his emotions. In one of the
film's most gripping scenes, Harford is drawn into a conspicuous
display of wealth, power, and intrigue. While mesmerized by the
events unfolding around him, he remains masked; his identity hid-
den from the anonymous participants, both physically, and to a
possibly greater extent, psychologically. In a shocking turn,
Harford is confronted, unmasked, and humiliated. The anonymous
horde discovers his identity and before long Harford nearly loses
his spouse, his medical practice, and his life.
Although Harford's desperate desire to shield his identity-and
the group's efforts to identify him-may seem like sheer fiction,
similar efforts occur every day among New York State medical
malpractice attorneys. Desperate parties go to extreme lengths to
identify their adversaries' experts, while their opponents struggle
to block their efforts. Experts that are ultimately unmasked fear
the loss of their practices, income, and professional lives.
This Comment discusses the provision of the New York Civil
Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") governing the disclosure of
medical malpractice expert witnesses, and how medical malpractice
* J.D. 2003, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. Geography, State Univer-
sity of New York at Buffalo. I would like to thank Anna for her love, my friends for
their never-ending encouragement, and the Editorial board and staff of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal-this piece would not have been possible without the support and
advice of my friends and colleagues on Urban. A special thank-you to Kim Smith,
and to Jonathan Deblinger, Michael Raniere, and Matthew Stein for their creativity.
Finally, I would like to thank Professor George W. Conk, Barry R. Temkin, and Stacie
L. Young for reviewing and commenting upon various drafts of this piece.
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litigants strive to protect the identities of their experts. 2 Part I of
this Comment discusses the applicable CPLR provision, beginning
with the 1985 amendments to CPLR 3101, 3 which, as part of medi-
cal malpractice reform legislation, sought to broaden discovery
within civil litigation.4 Part I will also highlight the medical mal-
practice expert exception provided by CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), which
applies solely to experts testifying in medical, dental, or podiatric
malpractice actions.'
Part II of this Comment discusses the initial judicial decisions
dealing with the amended CPLR 3101, and how courts initially
struggled to apply the medical malpractice expert exception.6 Part
III discusses the Appellate Division, Second Department case
Jasopersaud v. Rho,7 which attempted to create a workable stan-
dard to further the competing goals of CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i).8 Part
III also examines cases from the various Departments that have
interpreted and analyzed Jasopersaud.9 Part IV of this Comment
discusses the Appellate Division, Second Department's 2002 deci-
sion Thomas v. Alleyne. 10
Part V discusses whether the policy goals behind the medical
malpractice exception remain viable," and asks whether, in light of
evolving technology, any test that seeks to further the dual goals of
CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) can work. 2 Finally, Part V concludes that to
create judicial consistency among the Departments, either the
Court of Appeals must take up the issue and create a uniform stan-
dard for lower courts to follow, or the New York State Legislature
must either amend CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) or repeal the medical mal-
practice expert exception entirely.
2. The case and statutory law discussed in this Comment applies also to dental
and podiatric malpractice actions. For the sake of simplicity, this Comment will refer
solely to actions in medical malpractice.
3. See 1985 N.Y. Laws ch. 294, § 4 [hereinafter Medical Malpractice Reform
Act].
4. See infra notes 13-27 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
7. 572 N.Y.S.2d 700 (2d Dep't 1991).
8. See infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text (discussing the dual, often com-
peting goals of CPLR 3101).
9. 572 N.Y.S.2d 700 (2d Dep't 1991); see infra notes 52-71 and accompanying
text.
10. 752 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 2002); see infra notes 71-81 and accompanying
text.
11. See infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 121-126 and accompanying text
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I. BACKGROUND ON CPLR DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
CPLR 3101 is the central rule governing disclosure within civil
actions. The text of CPLR 3101 suggests that the New York State
Legislature intended to provide for broad information exchange
among civil litigants.13 Indeed, the Legislature intended CPLR
3101 to closely parallel its federal counterpart, Rule 26 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. 4
CPLR 3101 also provides for the disclosure of expert informa-
tion.15 Upon request, litigants must disclose specific background
information pertaining to their experts.16 To comply with Rule
3101, the litigant must
[I]dentify each person whom the party expects to call as an ex-
pert witness at trial ... [disclose] in reasonable detail the subject
matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance
of the facts and the opinions on which each expert is expected to
testify, the qualifications of each expert witness, and a summary
of the grounds of each expert's opinion.17
A litigant who fails to abide by CPLR 3101's disclosure man-
dates may be precluded from offering the expert at trial.18
13. CPLR 3101, entitled "Scope of disclosure," states "[t]here shall be full disclo-
sure of all matter material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a) (McKinney 2003).
14. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule 26 states, in pertinent part:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is
relevant to the claim or defense of any party .... Relevant information need
not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also 1985 Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil
Practice, reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 3347, 3380 [hereinafter Advisory Committee]
("With some variation, proposed CPLR 3101(d) would enact the substance of the
present federal rule.").
15. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(1)(i)-(iii).
16. CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) states, in pertinent part:
Upon request, each party shall identify each person whom the party expects
to call as an expert witness at trial and shall disclose in reasonable detail the
subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of
the facts and opinions on which each expert is expected to testify, the qualifi-
cations of each expert witness and a summary of the grounds for each ex-
pert's opinion.
17. Id. Within medical malpractice actions, expert "qualifications" have often
been held to include the expert's education, board certifications, special expertise,
board certifications, jurisdictions of licensure, internships, residencies, and fellow-
ships. See, e.g., Jasopersaud v. Rho, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (2d Dep't 1991).
18. See, e.g., Silverberg v. Cmty. Gen. Hosp., 736 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (3d Dep't
2002) ("[A] trial court has discretion to preclude expert testimony for failure to rea-
sonably comply with [CPLR 3101]"); Gholson v. Nassau, 711 N.Y.S.2d 899, 899 (2d
Dep't 2000). The litigant seeking preclusion, however, must show that she has been
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CPLR 3101's disclosure requirements were enacted in 1985 as
part of an effort to reform medical malpractice litigation in New
York. 19 Seeking to stem the perceived tide of rising medical insur-
ance premiums and judicial delays created by meritless claims, the
New York State Legislature broadened CPLR 3101's disclosure
provisions.2" The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985 (the
prejudiced by her opponent's failure to comply with CPLR 3101. Busse v. Clark
Equip. Co., 583 N.Y.S.2d 243, 244 (1st Dep't 1992) (describing preclusion as an "ex-
treme remedy"); see also Putchlawski v. Diaz, 597 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (1st Dep't 1993)
("[CPLR 31.01] . . . gives the court discretion 'for good cause shown' to 'make
whatever order may be just' in the event of noncompliance."') (quoting Campoli v.
Lobmeyer, 583 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 (3d Dep't 1992)). Rather than moving for preclu-
sion of an expert's testimony, a party who is dissatisfied with an opponent's response
to a disclosure demand may either serve a more detailed demand, or move to compel
disclosure under CPLR 3124. See Hartford v. Black & Decker, 634 N.Y.S.2d 294, 295
(4th Dep't 1995).
19. See Medical Malpractice Reform Act, supra note 3, at § 4. See generally, Betsy
A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State Leg-
islature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehen-
sive Reform, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 135, 135 (1986) (outlining the legislatures response to
the medical malpractice problems in New York).
20. See Medical Malpractice Reform Act, supra note 3, at § 1. In its legislative
findings, the Legislature noted:
The legislature finds and declares that a comprehensive reform of the medi-
cal and dental malpractice adjudication system is necessary in order to en-
sure the continued availability and affordability of quality health services of
New York State. Escalating malpractice insurance premiums discourage
physicians and dentists from initiating or continuing their practice in New
York and contribute to the rising cost of health care as premium costs are
passed along to the health care consumer. The legislature finds, therefore,
that steps must be taken to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance and to
restrain associated health care costs ....
Id.
The Memorandum of the State Executive Department supporting the legislation
echoed similar concerns:
Over the past decade, New York State has taken important steps to assure
the availability and to contain the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
The establishment of new medical malpractice carriers, improved profes-
sional misconduct procedures, and a number of evidentiary and litigation
reforms are among the major legislative initiatives that demonstrated the
commitment of the Legislative and Executive branches to this issue.
Despite these efforts, the cost of medical malpractice insurance has contin-
ued to increase at alarming rates. When combined with increased costs asso-
ciated with the practice of "defensive medicine"-the ordering of additional
and often unnecessary tests and consultations to protect the physician from
potential malpractice allegations-these costs significantly contribute to
ever-escalating health care costs and are ultimately borne by the consumer.
At the same time, the tort system itself has been generally called into
question. The 'medical malpractice crisis' has increasingly been viewed as
resulting from the inability of the existing litigation structure to provide
compensation for injured persons adequately, efficiently and fairly.
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"1985 Act") amended various provisions in the Public Health
Law,21 CPLR,22 Education Law,23 Insurance Law,24 and Judiciary
Law.25
The New York State Legislature intended the amended CPLR
3101 to streamline medical malpractice litigation, provide for
prompt settlements, and discourage groundless claims.26 Indeed, a
report from the New York State Executive Department recognized
the Legislature's intention that the amended expert disclosure pro-
visions would foster broad information exchange among medical
malpractice litigants:
Although virtually all other information is now shared by liti-
gants in civil practice, information concerning expert witnesses
and their opinions remains shielded from disclosure. Since the
testimony of expert witnesses is often the single most important
element of proof in medical malpractice and other personal in-
jury actions, sharing information concerning these opinions en-
courages prompt settlement by providing both parties an
accurate measure of the strength of their adversaries' case. In
addition, both parties will be discouraged from asserting unsup-
portable claims or defenses, knowing that they will be required
to disclose what, if any, expert evidence will support their
allegations.27
While the amendments to CPLR 3101 sought to bring a much
needed modernization to the expert witness disclosure process in
civil actions generally, they had a narrower impact on medical mal-
practice litigants. Attempting to avoid "unique problems "28 re-
lated to medical malpractice actions, the New York State
Legislature exempted medical malpractice litigants from one spe-
Legislative Memoranda: Medical Malpractice Insurance-Comprehensive Reform,
Memorandum of State Executive Department, reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 3019, 3021
[hereinafter Memorandum of State Executive Department]; see also Rosen, supra
note 19, at 143-44.
21. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2803-e, 2805-j, 2805-k (McKinney 2003).
22. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d), 3406, 4111, 4213, 4545, 5031-39, 8303-a.
23. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§ 6509(5)(d), 6509(11), 6524 (McKinney 2003).
24. N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 2343, 3437, 5502(e)(1) (McKinney 2003).
25. N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 148-a(1), 474-a(2)-(4) (McKinney 2003). See generally, Ro-
sen, supra note 19, at 147-52, 155-59, 163-79 (discussing the amendments to the Public
Health Law, CPLR, Education Law, Insurance Law, and Judiciary law made by the
1985 Act). This Comment will focus solely on changes made to CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i)
by the 1985 Act.
26. See Memorandum of State Executive Department, supra note 20, at 3025.
27. Id.; see also Jasopersaud v. Rho, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700, 702 (2d Dep't 1991) (dis-
cussing the legislative intent behind the 1985 Act).
28. See infra note 31.
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cific requirement provided by the amended provision-the re-
quirement that a litigant identify her expert.29
A. The Medical Malpractice Expert Exception
Under CPLR 3101, as amended by the 1985 Act, a medical mal-
practice litigant may refrain from disclosing the name of the expert
she intends to rely upon.30 The medical malpractice expert excep-
tion was enacted in response to concerns of possible harassment,
annoyance, or embarrassment directed at medical malpractice ex-
pert witnesses by their colleagues, who might attempt to discour-
age their testimony.31 Many decisions dealing with the medical
malpractice expert exception have reiterated this concern as an im-
29. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(1)(i).
30. Id. CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) states, in pertinent part:
In an action for medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, a party, in re-
sponding to a request, may omit the names of medical, dental, or podiatric
experts but shall be required to disclose all other information concerning
such experts otherwise required by this paragraph.
It is important to note that medical malpractice litigants are not required to omit their
experts' identities. CPLR 3101(d)(1)(ii) clearly provides for such disclosure, stating:
In an action for medical, dental, or podiatric malpractice, any party may...
offer to disclose the name of, and to make available for examination upon
oral deposition, any person the party making the offer expects to call as an
expert witness at trial .... If all parties accept the offer, each party shall be
required to produce his or her expert witness for examination upon oral
deposition ....
Despite providing the "carrot" of full disclosure, some argue that this provision is
rarely taken advantage of. See Marian E. Silber & Maria Elyse Raber, The Vicissi-
tudes of Expert Disclosure, N.Y. L.J., June 18, 1996, at 3. CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i)'s pro-
tections end, however, by jury selection. See Draves v. Chua, 642 N.Y.S.2d 1022, 1024
(Sup. Ct. Erie County 1996).
31. See Advisory Committee, supra note 14, at 3359 ("The Committee has been
advised that in medical malpractice actions, the mandatory pretrial identification of
medical experts poses unique problems which warrant the proposed statutory excep-
tion."); Scott C. Paton, Disclosing an Expert's Identity In a Medical Malpractice Ac-
tion, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 16, 1999, at 1. New York City medical malpractice attorneys
Matthew Gaier & Thomas A. Moore provide an enlightening account of the possibil-
ity of expert harassment:
[W]e did have one recent experience where an expert was intimidated into
withdrawing from the case on the eve of trial. The expert, a renowned neu-
rosurgeon, practicing in another state had agreed to testify for the plaintiff
more than a year in advance of trial, and the expert disclosure [effectively
identified the expert]. Several months before trial he accepted a position
with a hospital in Manhattan; however, he reaffirmed his commitment to
testify on behalf of the plaintiff. Only days before the trial was to com-
mence, when he was notified that the trial was going ahead, he refused to
testify. His office informed us that this neurosurgeon "was told he could not
testify." The defendant hospital in the case was not affiliated with the hospi-
tal at which he had accepted employment. Nor were any of the defendant
doctors affiliated with his new institution. It is obvious that someone either
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portant policy goal, one which acts as a counterweight to the
CPLR's goal of broad disclosure.32
The New York State Legislature's concern for medical malprac-
tice expert harassment resulted from New York's historical reliance
on the "locality rule" in medical malpractice actions. According to
the locality rule, the standard of care necessary to prove medical
malpractice was based on geographic proximity-plaintiffs were
required to show a violation of the standard of care particular to a
specific locality.33 This limitation required plaintiffs to retain ex-
perts familiar with the locality where the action was brought-ex-
perts who presumably might have worked alongside the doctors
they were retained to testify against.34
II. POST-1985 ACT DECISIONS
Soon after the passage of the 1985 Act, the Second Department
was confronted with the issue of possible inadvertent expert disclo-
sure in Catino v. Kirschbaum.35 The defendant served a demand
for the plaintiff's expert's qualifications under CPLR 3101,36 and
the plaintiff moved for a protective order.37 Affirming the trial
court's denial of the protective order, the Second Department
noted that "[w]hile CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) grants a party the right to
not disclose the name of a prospective medical expert, its underly-
ing purpose is not to preclude any possibility of identifying an ad-
versary's medical expert .... "38 Narrowly reading the medical
malpractice expert exception, the court essentially held that CPLR
from his new hospital or from an insurance company had exerted pressure
on him to withdraw from testifying in support of the plaintiff.
Matthew Gaier & Thomas A. Moore, Medical Malpractice: Disclosure of Experts'
Qualifications, N.Y. L.J. Feb. 3, 2003, at 1.
32. See, e.g., Scher v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp., N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at 18
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 28, 2003); Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 369 (2d
Dep't 2002); Duran v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup
Ct. Bronx County 1999), appeal withdrawn, 723 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 2001);
Jasopersaud v. Rho, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (2d Dep't 1991).
33. See Toth v. Cmty. Hosp., 239 N.E.2d 368, 372 (N.Y. 1968). See generally Rich-
ard S. Basuk, M.D., Note, Expert Witness Discovery for Medical Malpractice Cases in
the Courts of New York: Is it Time to Take Off the Blinders?, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1527,
1536-37 (2001) (discussing New York's historical reliance, and continuing move away
from, the locality rule).
34. See Basuk, supra note 33, at 1536.
35. 514 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (2d Dep't 1987), overruled by Jasopersaud v. Rho, 572
N.Y.S.2d 700, 708 (2d Dep't 1991).
36. The court did not name the specific qualifications demanded. See id.
37. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3103 (McKinney 2003); see also infra note 81 (describing the
"protective order" standard).
38. Id.
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3101(d)(1)(i) provides the medical malpractice litigant with the
"procedural" right to omit the name of her expert, not the "sub-
stantive" right to actually protect an expert's identity.39
Five months later, however, the Second Department turned
around and broadened its reading of the exception. In Jones v.
Putnam Hospital Center, the court held that a "request for further
information as to [a medical] expert's qualifications was palpably
improper since it would effectively lead to disclosure of the ex-
pert's identity."40 The Second Department did not have occasion
to rectify this patent inconsistency until four years later.4
The Third Department, in Pizzi v. Muccia, analyzed the compet-
ing policy goals behind the medical malpractice expert exception a
bit more thoroughly than had the Second Department.42 In Pizzi,
the court held that while a detailed demand for expert disclosure
"would have the net effect of disclosing the experts' identities," the
plaintiff seeking to protect an expert's identity should bear the bur-
den of showing that disclosure would likely identify the expert.43
Only upon such a showing would the court grant a motion for a
protective order.44
Other courts across New York State were similarly struggling to
apply the exception. In Avila v. New York, the Court of Claims
seemingly vitiated the exception by denying the defendant's mo-
tion for a protective order, and holding all demanded information
disclosable under the "qualifications" clause of CPLR 3101(d).45
The defendant first objected to the demand for their expert's ad-
dress, which the court denied, noting that "both the name and ad-
39. See id.
40. 519 N.Y.S.2d 665, 665 (2d Dep't 1987); see also Rogowski v. Royce W. Day
Co., 497 N.Y.S.2d 864, 865 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1986) (granting protective order
upon plaintiff's assertion that disclosure of demanded information would identify ex-
pert); cf Catino, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 752 (2d Dep't 1987).
41. See Jasopersaud, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 700; see also infra notes 51-58 and accompa-
nying text (describing the impact of Jasopersaud).
42. 515 N.Y.S.2d 341, 342-43 (3d Dep't 1987).
43. Id. at 343; cf. Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 369-70 (2d Dep't 2002);
Morris v. Clements, 644 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (3d Dep't 1996). See also Rubenstein v.
Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 527 N.Y.S.2d 680, 683 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988)
(allowing in camera procedure in summary judgment context, to protect against re-
vealing expert's identity); see infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
44. Pizzi, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 343.
45. 506 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413-14 (Ct. Cl. 1986); see also Hamilton v. Wein, 506
N.Y.S.2d 387, 389 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1986) ("Clearly, disclosure of the place of
education, extent of education, special areas of practice, the number of years of prac-
tice and whether or not the expert is board certified should be disclosed as bearing
upon qualifications of the witness.").
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dress of a witness to an occurrence giving rise to a cause of action
are proper subjects to disclosure. "46 The court again allowed dis-
closure of the expert's specialization as a qualification, as well as
the expert's professional memberships.4 7 Under this narrow read-
ing of the exception allowing the demanded disclosure, the court
did not discuss the possibility that the ordered disclosure could re-
sult in the expert's identification. 8
While the various Departments struggled to apply the medical
malpractice expert exception, there was little discussion of the im-
plications of increasing technological advancements on the efficacy
of the exception. Motions for protective orders were either
granted or denied, in inconsistent fashion.49 The Second Depart-
ment was the first court to directly confront these implications, in
Jasopersaud v. Rho.5" Attempting to create a workable solution to
the departmental inconsistencies, the court addressed the possibil-
ity that medical malpractice litigants, armed with a few key pieces
of information regarding their adversaries' experts, could identify
those experts and defeat the exception.51
III. JASOPERSAUD AND ITS PROGENY
In Jasopersaud v. Rho, the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment issued the first decision closely scrutinizing the medical mal-
practice expert exception within the terms of technological
46. Id. at 413 ("We see no reason why this principle should not be extended to
expert witnesses.").
47. Id. ("Mere membership in [professional organizations] does not, in and of it-
self, establish an individual's qualifications. However, since it is common practice to
inquire as to professional organizations, and since such membership may be tangen-
tially related to an expert's compentency [sic], we find the information sought to be
disclosable.").
48. In contrast to the Court of Claims in Avila, other courts of the time discussed
the possibility that disclosure could result in an expert's identification. See Carroll v.
Nunez, 550 N.Y.S.2d 1008, 1011 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County 1990) ("Of course, the more
detailed the information given in the effort to maximize the salubrious purposes of
CPLR 3101(d), the easier it is for even the most inept of sleuths to identify the oppos-
ing party's expert."); cf. Pizzi, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 343 ("[T]he request is so detailed that
disclosure would have the net effect of disclosing the experts' identities, even though
their names are never mentioned.").
49. Compare Hamilton, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 389 (granting motion for protective or-
der), and Jones v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 665, 665 (2d Dep't 1987), with
Catino v. Kirschbaum, 514 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (2d Dep't 1987) (denying motion for
protective order), and Pizzi, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (denying motion for protective
order).
50. 572 N.Y.S.2d 700 (2d Dep't 1991).
51. Id.; see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
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advancements since the 1985 Act. 52 The defendant demanded dis-
closure of the plaintiff's expert witness, seeking details regarding,
among other items, the expert's education, specializations, Board
Certifications, and hospital affiliations.5 3 The plaintiff moved for a
protective order, and argued that even with omitting the expert's
name, disclosing the demanded information would effectively per-
mit the defendant to quickly identify the expert and vitiate the ex-
ception.54 The trial court granted the plaintiff's motion, and the
defendant appealed.
The Second Department, analyzing the policy goals and legisla-
tive history of the 1985 Act, noted that "the Legislature could not
have intended to undermine a party's statutory right to omit an
expert's identity by authorizing excessively detailed demands for
an expert's qualifications. '56 The court also noted, however, that
the expert's education, training, and skills fell directly within the
CPLR's use of the term "qualifications. ' 57 To balance the compet-
ing concerns of privacy and disclosure, the court applied a "balanc-
ing test," whereby the "desirability of broad disclosure" would be
measured against the risk that disclosing the demanded informa-
tion would "effectively lead to the disclosure of the expert's
identity."58
The Jasopersaud balancing test overruled Second Department
precedent 59 and touched off a firestorm of subtle decisional incon-
sistencies in all four departments. Throughout the next decade,
Jasopersaud was both heavily criticized and followed by trial and
appellate courts alike, 60 and its reasoning misstated, misapplied,
and even ignored.
52. Id. While the Jasopersaud court was the first to closely analyze the technologi-
cal implications bearing upon the medical malpractice expert exception, it was by no
means the first court to recognize them. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Young, 514 N.Y.S.2d
872, 874 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1987) ("With answers to all those questions, it would
not take an experienced detective to easily discover the name of the medical
expert.").
53. Jasopersaud, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 700 (citing Jones v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't
1987)).
57. Id. at 702.
58. Id. at 701.
59. Catino v. Kirschbaum, 514 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1987), overruled by Jasoper-
saud, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 704; see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
60. E.g., Satkin v. McConnell, No. 4475/2003, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 283 (Sup.
Ct. Orange County, Mar. 20, 2003); Esquilin v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d
230, 234 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2002); Engel v. DeFeo, 737 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777-78
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Many courts seemed to cite Jasopersaud as the final link in a
result-oriented chain of reasoning, regardless of whether a protec-
tive order was granted or denied. Over the next decade, Jasoper-
saud was cited several times in decisions granting protective orders
to plaintiffs,6' and several times in decisions reaching the opposite
conclusions.62 In most cases, no mention was given to the compet-
ing factors of disclosure versus privacy.
In Thompson v. Swiantek, the Fourth Department cited Jasoper-
saud, yet without mention of its balancing test.63 The court noted
"It is undisputed that disclosure of the additional information
sought... would enable defendants to ascertain the identity of the
expert. '64 Given that information, however, the court failed to bal-
ance the interests of privacy against the CPLR's policy of broad
disclosure, and simply stated: "Because disclosure of that addi-
tional information would effectively lead to disclosure of the ex-
pert's identity, the request for such disclosure is palpably
improper. 65
Eventually, the lower courts' frustrations with the vague Jasoper-
saud standard began to show. In Engel v. DeFeo, a trial court,
while recognizing the propriety of the Jasopersaud balancing test,
criticized it in light of a decade of technological advances.66 The
court noted that modern technology would enable a medical mal-
practice litigant, with a modicum of effort, to effectively negate the
statutory protection provided by CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) with only a
few simple keystrokes.67 The court further noted:
While Jasopersaud has set up a viable balancing test to be used
in determining the issue of expert disclosure, technology has
rendered the fulcrum of that balance inoperable. Clearly, given
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2001) (describing the Jasopersaud balancing test as "inoper-
able"); Deitch v. May, 713 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281 (Sup. Ct. Rockland County 2000)
(describing the Jasopersaud balancing test as "stale case law"); Duran v. New York
City Health & Hosps. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1999), appeal
withdrawn, 723 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 2001).
61. See, e.g., Thompson v. Swiantek, 736 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 (4th Dep't 2002).
62. See, e.g., Yablon v. Coburn, 631 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dep't 1995).
63. 736 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citing Jones v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1987)).
While quoting from a pre-Jasopersaud case, however, the Fourth Department did see
fit to cite Jasopersaud itself, apparently without regard to its reasoning. See supra
note 36 and accompanying text; cf. Jones, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
66. 737 N.Y.S.2d 775, 777 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2001).
67. Id. ("There is no dispute herein of the effectiveness of the modern computer-
ized search engines which, when provided a minimal amount of information on a par-
ticular expert, can efficiently negate the statutory omission provided.").
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the information that the relevant statutory and case law permits,
current computer programs renders [sic] the protection of the
expert's identity impossible. It is not this Court's province, nor
is it the intent of this determination, to attack or declare CPLR
3101(d)l(i) invalid. It must be left to the New York State Legis-
lature to revisit said statute, inasmuch as technology has made
the present applicability of Jasopersaud impossible, or at least
improbable. 68
A Kings County trial court echoed the same concerns of the En-
gel court, noting that "[C]omputer technology has expanded
greatly in the 10 1/2 years since Jasopersaud ... 69 Indeed the
court, criticizing the policy goals furthered by the medical malprac-
tice expert exception, also noted that "so has the willingness and
availability of medical 'experts' to come forward and testify against
the interests of their colleagues. ' 70  Since Jasopersaud, no other
court has strongly questioned the rationale behind the medical
malpractice expert exception, and the decision that abrogated
Jasopersaud, Thomas v. Alleyne, was no exception.7'
IV. THOMAS V. ALLEYNE. 72 BURDEN SHIFTING
In Thomas v. Alleyne, decided in December 2002, the Second
Department recognized the inherent inconsistencies and weak rea-
soning behind a "balancing test," and abrogated Jasopersaud.73 In
68. Id. at 777-78 (citation omitted).
69. Esquilin v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
2002); see also Duran v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 795
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1999), appeal withdrawn, 723 N.Y.S.2d 422 (2001). The court
in Duran, possibly forecasting Jasopersaud's demise, went as far as to deem the defen-
dant's reliance on Jasopersaud as "misplaced, considering the current state of the In-
ternet and the resources available to counsel." Id.
70. Esquilin, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 233. In questioning the rationale behind the statu-
tory protection, the court asserted that:
The proliferation of medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice cases since
1985 with the concomitant availability of 'experts' ready, willing, and able to
testify, calls into question the validity of those concerns today. The technol-
ogy and attitudes of the present era make the policy considerations that
prompted the statute irreconcilable or irrelevant in today's world.
Id. But see Gaier & Moore, supra note 31, at 1. After tearing apart the fabric upon
which Jasopersaud rests, the court noted that it "still regards Jasopersaud as prevailing
and controlling authority which, even now, properly 'harmonize[s] and effectuate[s]
the objectives sought to be achieved by the competing provisions of [CPLR
3101(d)(1)(i)].'" Esquilin, 739 N.Y.S.2d at 234 (citing Jasopersaud, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700,
703 (2d Dep't 1991)).
71. 752 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 2002).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 368 (abrogating the Jasopersaud balancing test).
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Thomas, a defendant served the plaintiff with an exhaustive list of
discovery demands regarding the plaintiff's expert witness. 74 The
plaintiff moved for a protective order, on the grounds that provid-
ing the information would effectively identify the expert. 75 The
court discussed the rapid technological advances since the Jasoper-
saud court's time, noting that a medical malpractice litigant's iden-
tity could be easily ascertained with only the barest information
regarding the expert's qualifications.76 While the plaintiff argued
that the technological evolution militated toward a policy of requir-
ing narrower disclosure due to the ease in identifying experts, the
court saw the argument the other way-any attempt to conceal a
medical malpractice expert's identity would be futile.77
In response to this perceived futility, the Second Department
threw out the Jasopersaud test, describing it as "no longer worka-
ble."'78 The court held that instead of "harmon[izing] and effec-
tuat[ing] the objectives sought to be achieved by the competing
provisions of [CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i)], ' 79 defendants would be pre-
sumptively entitled to full disclosure of the expert witness's qualifi-
cations, even if such disclosure would effectively identify the
expert.8 ° Plaintiffs could seek a protective order under CPLR
3103(a), however, if they could show that upon disclosing the ex-
pert's qualifications, there would be a reasonable probability that
the disclosure would identify the expert, and that there would be a
reasonable probability that the expert would suffer embarrass-
ment, harassment, or expense.8'
74. Id. at 364.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 368 ("We agree with the plaintiff, that, in light of the expansion of com-
puter technology, it has become markedly easier for attorneys, or their employees, to
perform various research functions that, at the time of the enactment of CPLR
3101(d)(1)(i) in 1985 would have required significantly more time and effort.") (cita-
tion omitted).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Jasopersaud v. Rho, 572 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (2d Dep't 1991).
80. Thomas, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 369; see also supra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text; cf Pizzi v. Muccia, 515 N.Y.S.2d 341 (3d Dep't 1987).
81. Thomas, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 371. CPLR 3103, entitled "Protective Orders,"
states, in pertinent part:
(a) Prevention of abuse. The court at any time on its own initiative, or on
motion of any party or of any person from whom discovery is sought, make a
protective order denying, limiting, conditioning or regulating the use of any
disclosure device. Such order shall be designed to prevent unreasonable an-
noyance, expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or other prejudice to any
person or the courts.
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A New York County trial court, lacking recent guidance from
the First Department 82 quickly adopted the Thomas court's rea-
soning and predicted its eventual adoption by the First Depart-
ment, in Scher v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital.83 In Scher, the
plaintiff suffered a stroke while in the care of St. Luke's-Roosevelt
Hospital, leaving him with severe brain damage, and he sued the
hospital for medical malpractice.84
The defendant served the plaintiff with a demand for expert wit-
ness disclosure under CPLR 3101(d)(1), seeking the qualifications
of the expert witness, including medical school information, board
certifications, areas of expertise, years of practice, jurisdictions of
licensure, a list of authored publications, and locations and years of
internships, residencies, and fellowships." The plaintiff answered
only in general terms, relying on the statutory protection of CPLR
3101(d)(1)(i). 86 The defendant moved to compel disclosure of the
expert's medical school, location of residencies, and any sub-
specialty training; the court granted the defendant's motion.87
The court predicted that the First Department would eventually
"adopt the trend favoring more liberal disclosure and conclude that
CPLR 3101(d), by its plain terms, authorizes omission of a medical
expert's name while mandating disclosure of all other information
concerning such experts. '88 The court acknowledged that disclos-
ing the expert's qualifications could lead to the expert's identifica-
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101.(a) (McKinney 2003). The precursors to the Thomas court's rea-
soning can clearly be seen in Pizzi v. Muccia, 515 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (3d Dep't 1987)
("[W]hile plaintiffs assert that the qualifications items sought by defendant are im-
mune from disclosure because they effectively reveal the experts' identities, they have
made no demonstration of how the identities would be revealed. The mere assertion
that identities would be revealed is insufficient.").
82. The First Department had not been faced with the issue since 1995. See
Yablon v. Coburn, 631 N.Y.S.2d 351, 351 (1st Dep't 1995). The Yablon court, citing
Jasopersaud, held that "the need for [the demanded information] outweigh[ed] the
unlikelihood[sic] that the information would allow identification of the expert's
name." Id.
83. N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 2003, at 18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Jan. 27, 2003).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. Responding to the Hospital's demand, the plaintiff answered:
Plaintiff will introduce the testimony of an expert in the area of Internal
Medicine. The expert is board-certified in internal medicine. The expert
graduated from a major northeast medical school, is licensed to practice
medicine in New York. The expert completed a residency program in Inter-
nal Medicine.
Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(d)(1)(i) (McKinney 2003)).
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tion, but noted that the plaintiff had made "absolutely no
showing.., that the disclosure would probably cause the expert to
be subjected to 'unreasonable annoyance, expense, embarrass-
ment, disadvantage, or other prejudice."' 89 A coordinate court in
the First Department concurred, holding the Thomas approach
"more consistent with the intent and plain language of CPLR
3101(d)(1)(1)."90
Another trial court in the First Department came to the opposite
conclusion, in Hara v. Levin.91 The court noted the many criticisms
of the Jasopersaud test, and held a medical malpractice litigant's
bare disclosure proper.92 While the Hara court rejected the
Jasopersaud test, it came to a completely different conclusion than
Scher:
As shown supra, the sentiment has been expressed time and
time again by the Courts that the directives set forth in Jasoper-
saud as to the information that must be revealed about a party's
expert are outdated and out of touch with the modern world of
computer technology .... The bottom line is that the expert
witness' identity is to be concealed, and if providing the infor-
mation discussed supra will lead to the discovery of the witness'
identity, then this Court is of the opinion that the information is
not discoverable. 93
Whereas the Scher court placed the burden upon the party op-
posing disclosure to show that their expert would be identified,
narrowing the exception, the Hara court applied the exception
broadly. The court assumed that disclosing the expert's qualifica-
tions would identify the expert, and thus held the disclosure
improper.
89. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 371 (2d Dep't 2002)).
90. Muniz v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., No. 20301/1999, 2003 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 617, at *9 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, May 7, 2003) (granting motion to compel,
noting that opponent had made "[a]bsolutely no showing ... that there is a reasona-
ble probability that the requested disclosure would lead to discovery of Plaintiff's
expert's identification.").
91. No. 14134/01, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 184, at *10 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County, Jan.
21, 2003).
92. In response to the defendants' demands, the plaintiff in Hara noted that its
expert "attended medical school ... internship, residency, and/or fellowship programs
in the United States," and that its expert was licensed to practice medicine in New
York State. Id. at *1-2.
93. Id.
2076 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXX
V. HE FUTURE OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
EXPERT EXCEPTION
Decisional inconsistencies still exist within all New York Appel-
late Division Departments and trial courts.94 While the Second
Department has embraced the presumption that expert informa-
tion is disclosable unless the opponent can show a reasonable
probability that the disclosure will result both in its expert's identi-
fication and probable harassment,95 trial courts in the First Depart-
ment still must follow Yablon v. Coburn,96 which provided little
guidance. Recent criticisms of Yablon by lower courts,97 however,
as well as the recent New York County case of Scher v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hospital, indicate that the First Department may soon
embrace the presumption of disclosure standard issued by the Sec-
ond Department in Thomas.98
The Third and Fourth Departments, however, have not fully
clarified just where they stand on the issue. The Fourth Depart-
ment seems to be leaning toward a standard of protection,99 follow-
ing the early Second Department case of Jones v. Putnam Hospital
Center.100 The Third Department, however, has arguably been in
line with the new Thomas standard since CPLR 3101's amend-
ment. Pizzi v. Muccia,'01 decided in 1987, which was effectively
reaffirmed in the 1996 case of Morris v. Clements, °2 closely paral-
lels the Thomas standard. 1°3
94. See Satkin v. McConnell, No. 4475/2003, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 283, at *8
(Sup. Ct. Orange County, Mar. 20, 2003) (following Thomas, and applying decision
retroactively); Gaier & Moore, supra note 31, at 1. Compare Scher v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at 18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 28, 2003), with
Hara, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 184, at *9-10. Compare also Thompson v. Swiantek,
736 N.Y.S.2d 819 (4th Dep't) rearg. denied 742 N.Y.S.2d 180 (4th Dep't 2002), with
Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362 (2d Dep't 2002).
95. Thomas, 752 N.Y.S.2d at 369-70.
96. 631 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1st Dep't 1995); see supra note 62.
97. See Duran v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County 1999), appeal withdrawn, 723 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 2001).
98. N.Y. L.J., Jan. 28, 2003, at 18 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County, Jan. 27, 2003); see supra
notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
99. See Thompson, 736 N.Y.S.2d at 820; see also supra note 63-65.
100. 519 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1987); see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
101. 515 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (3d Dep't 1987); see supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
102. 644 N.Y.S.2d 850, 851 (3d Dep't 1996); see supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
103. See Clements, 644 N.Y.S.2d at 851
With the exception of [an expert's name], virtually all information regarding
expert witnesses ... is discoverable under CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) .... To avoid
an order directing such disclosure, a party must move for a protective order
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A. Is the Medical Malpractice Expert Exception Necessary?
No decision on the fate of the medical malpractice expert excep-
tion can be reached until there is a consensus on the need for the
exception. The first few sections of this Comment have illustrated
the judicial difficulties in crafting a workable test to apply to excep-
tion, and it is not difficult to see why. Decisions are inconsistent,
with different courts relying upon alternatively broad or narrow
readings of the exception.104 Even decisions within Departments
are inconsistent, and often contradictory.' °5 These conflicts may
result from disagreements as to the policy goals behind the
exception.
Several courts have criticized the rationale for the medical mal-
practice exception. 10 6 Some argue that the exception is outdated
and unneeded, and should be repealed.107 Repealing the exception
would at least eliminate the difficulties inherent in inconsistent
application.
As noted earlier, the medical malpractice expert exception was
crafted by the New York State Legislature to combat concerns of
harassment, annoyance, or embarrassment directed at experts by
their peers.10 8 These concerns have been attacked on several
fronts. Some courts have simply taken issue with the assertion that
experts would face such problems.10 9 Under this view, experts sim-
ply are not subject to the harassment and embarrassment feared by
the Legislature almost two decades ago, and the Legislature's con-
cerns are simply outdated and irrelevant.
Another argument against the exception hinges on the decline of
the locality rule."10 The locality rule, with its concomitant expert
and to succeed thereon, the movant must shoulder the burden of demon-
strating that the information sought is immune from disclosure.
Id.
104. Compare Scher v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hosp., N.Y. L.J., Jan 28, 2003, at 18
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Jan. 27, 2003) (reading medical malpractice expert exception
narrowly), with Hara v. Levin, No. 14134/01, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 184, at *10 (Sup.
Ct. Bronx County Jan. 21, 2003) (reading exception broadly).
105. See id. Compare, e.g., Catino v. Kirschbaum, 514 N.Y.S.2d 751, 752 (2d Dep't
1987), with Jones v. Putnam Hosp. Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1987); see also
supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 369 (2d Dep't 2002); Esquilin v.
Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2002).
107. See Basuk, supra note 33, at 1551-52.
108. See Advisory Committee, supra note 14, at 3359; see also notes 31-32 and ac-
companying text.
109. See Esquilin v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 2002); see also supra note 70.
110. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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harassment, flourished in New York for decades before the Legis-
lature created the medical malpractice exception in 1985.111 The
medical malpractice expert exception might have been desirable,
even necessary, under a regime that forced a medical malpractice
litigant to produce an expert intimately familiar with the local stan-
dard of care. Presumably, this expert would be likely to be testify-
ing against close colleagues, or even friends. These concerns to
protect experts were thus inherent to the time. As New York
courts move away from the locality rule, however, the rationale
behind the medical malpractice expert exception weakens. 2 As
familiarity with the local standard of care becomes less important,
experts are less likely to be testifying against close colleagues. In-
deed, experts in medical malpractice cases may increasingly come
from far away jurisdictions, and have little or no prior contact with
litigants prior to trial.1 13
Some critics of the medical malpractice expert exception note
that even accepting the concerns of expert harassment as true, an
expert can only be harassed once-after initial litigation ends, the
expert has effectively been "outed" for all time.114 Should the ex-
pert's colleagues be so inclined, they may exert pressure upon the
expert not to testify in the future-vitiating the protections of the
medical malpractice expert exception as to that expert." 5
Finally, many commentators argue that the medical malpractice
expert exception serves only the purposes of judicial delay and
obfuscation, and diverts energies from adjudicating the important
111. See Basuk, supra note 33, at 1536.
112. See Kenny v. Lesser, 722 N.Y.S.2d 302, 304 (3d Dep't 2001); Payant v. Imober-
steg, 682 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137 (3d Dep't 1998); Darwak v. Benedictine Hosp., 669
N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (3d Dep't 1998); Hoagland v. Kamp, 552 N.Y.S.2d 978, 979 (3d
Dep't 1990) ("Whatever may actually be the standard of care practiced by general
dentists in any particular locality in this State, if it is less demanding than the mini-
mum level of skill ... it is unacceptable. If that were not true, spectacular ineptitude
could be condoned under the guise of the locality rule."); see also Basuk, supra note
33, at 1536-37 (discussing New York's decreasing reliance on the locality rule in medi-
cal malpractice actions).
113. See Riley v. Wieman, 528 N.Y.S.2d 925, 928-29 (3d Dep't 1988) (allowing testi-
mony of California expert, rejecting strict compliance with locality rule). But see
Prooth v. Walsh, 432 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669-70 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980) ("[T]here is
still some basis for requiring that the level of proper medical practice be that of the
same or similar communities."). One court has noted the potential scarcity of quali-
fied experts in a given community qualified to testify in medical malpractice actions as
an argument against applying the locality rule. See Hirschberg v. State, 398 N.Y.S.2d
470, 474 (Ct. Cl. 1977). But see Riley, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29.
114. See Basuk, supra note 33, at 1536 n. 46.
115. See id.
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issues." 6 The exception is an anomaly, having no analogous provi-
sion in either the Federal Rules1 17 or other states' civil practice.' 18
While the medical malpractice expert exception cannot be wholly
condemned, it does seem inconsistent with the CPLR's policy of
broad disclosure. 119 While the amendments to CPLR 3101(d),
taken together, broaden disclosure in civil litigation, the medical
malpractice expert exception only frustrates this effort.12 0
B. The Search for a Workable Standard
The inconsistent application of Jasopersaud, along with the re-
cent Second Department adoption of the Thomas standard, leads
the medical malpractice litigant (or judge, for that matter), to one
inescapable question-Is any standard created by judicial fiat
workable?
It appears increasingly clear that advances in technology have
made it easier for a medical malpractice litigant to identify their
opponent's expert with only a few pieces of key information. 121
116. See, e.g., Basuk, supra note 33, at 1531 (arguing that the medical malpractice
expert exception remains a national anomaly, frustrates the intent of the CPLR to
encourage broad disclosure in civil actions, and "encourages medical malpractice at-
torneys in New York to engage in a robust motion practice that diverts energies and
resources from just settlements and trials on the merits").
117. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") Rule 26 is the central rule gov-
erning discovery in federal civil actions, and does not shield expert identities from
discovery. FRCP 26(a)(2), entitled "Disclosure of Expert Testimony," states, in perti-
nent part:
[D]isclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially em-
ployed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an em-
ployee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness. The
report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and
the basis and reasons therefore; ... the qualifications of the witness, includ-
ing a list of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten
years.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)
118. See, e.g., Basuk, supra note 33, at 1528 n.6 (2001). Basuk notes that twenty-
five states allow parties to depose an opponent's expert witness, while twenty-four
states and the District of Columbia, while not explicitly allowing depositions, provide
for interrogatories. Id.
119. See, e.g., id. at 1551-52.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 368 (2d Dep't 2002)
("[T]echnological [advances] point to the futility of attempting to conceal the identity
of expert witnesses in medical malpractice cases .... "); Duran v. New York City
Health and Hosps. Corp., 696 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1999), appeal
withdrawn, 723 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1st Dep't 2001) (criticizing Jasopersaud, in light of "the
current state of the Internet and the resources available to counsel."). Clearly illus-
trating his point, Basuk notes that he, a former practicing surgeon, was able to quickly
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Even with technology two decades advanced from the 1985 Act,
the medical malpractice identity exception provided by CPLR
3101(d) may be effectively inoperative. 122 While the policy goals
behind the medical malpractice expert exception may be noble, it is
completely incompatible with current technology.
The Jasopersaud court was the first to attempt to develop a
workable test to determine whether a medical malpractice expert's
information should be disclosed. 23 The Jasopersaud balancing test
sought to balance the two competing forces: broad disclosure
under CPLR 3101, and the risk of expert identification sought to
be protected by the medical malpractice expert exception. Ad-
vances in technology, however, make it almost certain that the
barest disclosure by a litigant of its expert's qualifications will iden-
tify the expert. 124 Put simply, the goal of expert privacy cannot be
realized without completely frustrating the goal of broad disclo-
sure. The risk of expert identification will always trump the policy
of disclosure.
The CPLR's policies of broad disclosure, planned to speed the
resolution of claims,'125 will continue to be frustrated by judicial
scrutiny of the risk of identification. If a court is required to scruti-
nize every motion for a protective order every time a medical mal-
practice litigant receives a demand for expert disclosure, the
disclosure envisioned by CPLR 3101(d)(1) will rarely occur. When
faced with near certain expert identification, the scales will tip in
favor of protecting the expert's identity, as long as the exception
remains.
Of the several applications and tests put forth by the various Ap-
pellate Division Departments to further the competing goals of
CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i), the Second Department's Thomas test argua-
bly works best. Although it is far from perfect, the Thomas court
recognized the contradictions inherent in balancing the goals of
identify himself, and only himself, as a possible expert by entering a few pieces of
information such as his medical education, residency, and board certifications into the
GENMED-ABMS database on LEXIS. Basuk, supra note 33, at 1544 n.83.
122. See Nathan L. Dembin & Edward J. Yun, Medical Expert Witness Disclosure
Under CPLR: An Anachronism, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 1, 1997, at 1 (describing the exception
as a "paper tiger").
123. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
124. E.g., Satkin v. McConnell, No. 4475/2003, 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 283, at *3
(Sup. Ct. Orange County, Mar. 20, 2003); Hara v. Levin, No. 14134/2001, 2003 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 184, at *4-5 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County, Jan. 21, 2003); Esquilin v. Brooklyn
Hosp. Ctr., 739 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 2002).
125. See Memorandum of State Executive Department, supra note 20, at 3021; see
also supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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disclosure and expert privacy. Under the Thomas test, the pre-
sumption will be to disclose the expert's qualifications.1 2 6 Only if
the opponent of disclosure can show that a reasonable possibility
exists that disclosure will result in the identification of its expert,
and that a reasonable possibility exists that such identification
would result in harassment or annoyance of the expert, will a liti-
gant be able to overcome the presumption of disclosure. This test
recognizes that a blanket application of the exception would com-
pletely frustrate disclosure, and seeks to create a workable solution
to the conflict.
C. A Prescription for the Future
Regardless of whether the goals behind the medical malpractice
exception remain necessary, courts will continue to face inconsis-
tent results unless the issue is clarified from above. The Court of
Appeals must put forth a consistent standard that both furthers the
policy goals behind CPLR 3101's broad disclosure provision yet re-
spects the medical malpractice expert exception.1 27 Alternatively,
the New York State Legislature must amend CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i)
to reflect the current state of technology, or repeal it entirely. Un-
til a workable solution is prescribed, either the policies of disclo-
sure or privacy will be completely vitiated.
CONCLUSION
While the medical doctors serving as expert witnesses in New
York State medical malpractice actions face pressures of a different
sort than our fictional William Harford, the efforts to retain ano-
nymity is no less real. Perhaps Eyes Wide Shut represents yet an-
other case of art imitating life. Doctors, through their attorneys,
desperately seek to remain nameless, their identities hidden by the
masks of protective orders, while their opponents strive to unmask
them.
While the policy goals behind the medical malpractice expert ex-
ception is debatable, it is clear that intervention is needed for rea-
sons of finality and consistency. Either the Court of Appeals must
take up the issue and finalize a working test to ensure statewide
uniformity, or the New York State Legislature must clarify or re-
126. See Thomas v. Alleyne, 752 N.Y.S.2d 362, 369-70 (2d Dep't 2002); see also
supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Napierski v. Finn, 646 N.Y.S.2d 415, 417 (3d Dep't 1996) (discussing
competing policies behind CPLR 3101(d)); Wagner v. Kingston Hosp., 582 N.Y.S.2d
214, 215 (2d Dep't 1992).
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peal the medical malpractice expert exception. For as long as
CPLR 3101(d)(1)(i) remains in its present form, the battle to un-
mask medical experts will continue unabated.
